Thirty basis points is not a rounding error. On a mid-sized B2B distributor running $10 million a year through the platform, it is $30,000 annually, every year, compounding quietly inside statements that arrive pre-reconciled by the very software that charges them. And it lands on a company whose entire brand is the opposite promise: Versapay sells itself as the processor that lowers your effective rate through automated interchange optimization. In our professional opinion, that is what makes this finding worse than an ordinary increase. A merchant who buys a rate optimizer reasonably believes the rate question is handled, stops watching, and lets the AR software mark its own homework. The increase arrives anyway, the software reconciles it without complaint, and the one party in the arrangement paid to notice, the processor, is the party collecting it. Our audits noticed. The refusal to reverse, after documentation and challenge, converts a pricing decision into a documented posture: the increase was not an error to be corrected. It was the plan.

No FTC actions, state attorney general enforcement, class actions, or card network fines against Versapay or Solupay Consulting were located, and independent review documents an unusually clean litigation file. Full marks, honestly given, with the standing reminder our methodology attaches to every clean docket: a small merchant footprint and B2B contracts produce fewer public filings by their nature, and readers of our Clearent rating already know that a perfect legal record and a merchant-friendly fee record are two different things. The next category is why.

Credit where the record earns it: the public complaint file is genuinely thin, near-zero BBB volume, no documented fund-hold pattern, and nothing resembling the freeze machinery that fills this category on most of this board. The deductions come from what is documented: a merchant charged three times for a single annual service through the platform’s automated payments, unable to reach Versapay by website, chat, or phone; and the post-Clover support structure in which Versapay must open tickets with another company’s support desk, documented as too slow for the banking windows that govern voiding a payment. An automation platform whose failure mode is automated overbilling, reachable by no channel, earns its deduction even at low volume.

The deductions stack: no published pricing anywhere, quote-only by design; a brand whose legal entity is a different name than its trademark, on statements that carry its logo over a third company’s rails, so that the billing entity, the brand, and the actual acquirer can be three different organizations; private-equity ownership with no public disclosure; and a corporate history of acquisition, merger, and mid-stream gateway migration that the documented record shows merchants experiencing as support disruption. A merchant on this platform who wants to know what they pay, to whom, and under whose rules, has to audit their way to all three answers. We know, because that is literally our job on these accounts.

Is Versapay a good processor? Based on the documented record, Versapay scored 60 out of 100 under the published weAudit Rating Methodology, a band our methodology describes as a documented pattern of merchant-hostile practices: fee increases averaging 30 basis points documented in our own audit files and defended after challenge, an unpublished fee menu with a deconversion fee guarding the exit, and statements that carry Versapay’s logo over other processors’ rails. The AR automation is genuinely good; the documented conduct on the accounts is what the score measures.

Three things to do this week: